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Abstract 
Multiactor global funds (MGFs) are emerging as important new mechanisms for the 
financing of development and other global priorities. MGFs like the Global Fund for 
AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria are distinctive because they are administered and 
financed by multiactor coalitions of governments, international organizations, the 
private sector and civil society, they operate independently of any one institution and 
are tied to particular issue or policy areas. This paper considers the desirability of MGFs 
as instruments for international financial mobilization, resource allocation and as a form 
of experimentation in global governance. It is argued that MGFs hold considerable 
promise as focal points for generating additional public and private resources to address 
urgent global problems and to finance global public goods. They may be more 
operationally nimble than traditional mechanisms and capture some of the benefits of 
collaboration among different actors. However, MGFs may also result in a less coherent 
response to global problems, duplicate existing structures and be weakly democratically 
accountable. 
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Multiactor global funds (MGFs), as identified in this study, are emerging as an 
increasingly popular and important mechanism for the mobilization and distribution of 
international financial resources. Several such funds already have annual disbursements 
that exceed the core budgets of major UN agencies, and new funds with even broader 
mandates are currently being proposed. At first glance, these powerful instruments for 
globally coordinated action represent a departure from traditional forms of multilateral 
governance because non-state actors share decisionmaking powers and financing 
responsibilities with national governments, as in other forms of ‘networked’, multiactor 
governance that are developing at the global level. Yet comparatively little is known 
about the way these funds operate, whether they are desirable as instruments for 
financing major international initiatives, and what implications they might have for 
global governance more broadly. This last question seems especially important 
considering that, even though a key principle behind these funds is that they be 
‘additional’ to existing sources of finance, the proliferation of MGFs may come at the 
expense of established international organizations—both in terms of resource flows and 
of their prestige in the international system. 
The funds described here are different from the official trust funds that have been 
administered by the World Bank and other international organizations for decades. 
MGFs are dedicated to a specific issue or policy area of global significance and they 
explicitly involve multiple stakeholders. They operate as partnerships between the 
‘official’ sector (governments and intergovernmental organizations at various levels) 
and business (including private charitable foundations and individual corporations), 
NGOs of different types and geographies, and other actors, such as education and 
research institutions. MGFs operate independently of any one institution, and are 
usually set up either as new entities with their own legal identity or as alliances with 
legally constituted financing arms.  
The principal case study in this paper is the new Global Fund for AIDS, Tuberculosis 
and Malaria (GFATM). The fund, which has so far collected more than US$2bn in 
pledges from governments and the private sector, is a major international enterprise that 
is likely to set an important precedent for future efforts like it in other areas of global 
concern.1 The research presented here is based on a detailed study of the negotiation 
process to establish the fund and its subsequent start-up phase, a period that raised many 
of the difficult technical and political choices involved in establishing MGFs. A second 
MGF with fairly similar characteristics is the recently established Global Alliance for 
Vaccines and Immunization (GAVI) and its financial instrument, the Vaccine Fund,2 
whose mission is children’s immunization. The Global Environment Facility (GEF), 
which derives its mandate from multilateral environmental agreements formed in the  
early 1990s is a treaty instrument that limits the involvement of non-state actors in its 
                                                           
1  This article draws on more than 35 interviews with participants in the negotiating process to establish 
the GFATM and with other relevant experts, and on a study of internal documentation and options 
papers charting the choices facing the fund in its start-up phase.  
2  While the Vaccine Fund is a financing and fundraising instrument and GAVI is an alliance with no 
financial mechanism in this study, they are considered together. Although they have separate boards 
and are legally independent of each other for tax and other reasons, in practice GAVI functions as the 
policy and operational arm of the Vaccine Fund, which disburses funding based on the 
recommendations of the GAVI board. In the GFATM and the GEF these functions are not separated.   
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governance arrangements, and in that sense is distinct from GFATM and GAVI. But it 
has faced a number of similar challenges, and so is included here for comparison. Some 
basic facts about these funds are outlined in Table 1. 
This paper critically evaluates the potential of multiactor global funds as financing 
instruments, and, as some see them, pilot programmes for new and improved global 
governance.3 MGFs aspire to be innovative and more effective than traditional 
instruments in a number of areas. First, they are designed to be ‘lean’, ‘non-
bureaucratic’ and ‘quick to act’—qualities that are often seen to be lacking in 
institutions and financing channels with broader mandates. Second, they promise an 
aggressive focus on results, to the point of withholding funding to non-performing 
recipients. Third, by giving non-state actors a major stake in their governance and 
activities, MGFs seek to realize the benefits of multi-stakeholder collaboration and the 
principles of ‘networked governance’, including the harmonization of activities across 
sectors and leveraging the expertise and knowledge of civil society and the private 
sector. Finally, because of their comparative advantages compared to other funding 
sources, and because they can be used to focus attention and create a sense of urgency 
around a particular issue of global significance, MGFs are seen as magnets to raise 
additional funds from both public and private sources.  
Table 1 
GFATM, GEF and GAVI/The Vaccine Fund 
 GFATM  GEF  GAVI 
Current annual 
disbursements 
Estimated at US$700m in 
first full year of operations. 
Expected to grow in year 2. 
~US$600m per year  ~US$160m per year over five 
years currently committed to 
53 eligible countries, 
expected to grow with further 
rounds of funding awards 
     
Year established  2002  1991, pilot programme;  
1994 restructured GEF 
1999 
     
Fiduciary 
arrangements 
World Bank is trustee, sub-
trustees at national level. 
Disbursements to be made 
directly to governments. 
World Bank is trustee   UNICEF is trustee 
2  Political context: MGFs and international organizations 
Before considering the merits of multiactor global funds, it is important to understand 
the political context in which they are currently being created. Multiactor global funds, 
with their emphasis on decentralization and rejection of bureaucracy, their orientation 
                                                           
3  The claims made by proponents of MGFs are similar to those made about other forms of ‘networked 
governance’ at the global level. These transnational governance mechanisms, which have been 
referred to as global policy or issues networks, might carry out a number of functions such as placing 
particular issues on the international agenda, setting standards and international norms, gathering and 
disseminating valuable knowledge (Reinicke and Deng et al. 2000) or, in the case of MGFs, 
mobilizing and allocating international financial resources. The growing interest in the concept of 
global public goods is another manifestation of the same trend, especially in terms of the 
disaggregation of key governance tasks. Indeed, proponents of a global public goods agenda have 
cited ‘networked governance’ as an important means of producing and in some cases financing these 
goods (see, for example, Kaul et al. 2003).  
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towards specific issues and tasks in support of a focus on ‘results’ and the embrace of 
the notion of partnership, in which non-state actors are key players and international 
organizations are seen as stakeholders playing narrower, targeted roles, seem at least in 
part to be a response to the perceived inadequacies of existing multilateral processes and 
institutions, and of the United Nations and its agencies in particular. Their popularity 
also reflects the political implausibility of raising much-needed new funds through the 
UN. In many respects, however, they remain reliant on the infrastructure and expertise 
of UN agencies.  
The history of the United Nations’ involvement with the GFATM reveals a great deal 
about attitudes towards the UN, in particular among donor governments. Participants in 
the GFATM negotiating process describe an atmosphere of ‘hostility’ towards the UN 
from several key governments during the period of the fund’s creation. One of several 
examples of this was at a meeting to discuss the fund in early June 2001, the UN (and 
particularly the World Health Organization) was almost forced out of negotiations 
because of a perception that it was trying to ‘grab the money’.4 As one US government 
official put it, ‘If we wanted to increase WHO’s budget, we would. We don’t want [the 
GFATM] to become part of a UN agency’. Later, during the fund’s negotiating process, 
a lengthy debate ensued about whether the fund should be co-located with the UN 
technical programmes (WHO and UNAIDS) in Geneva. Despite the potential synergies 
in terms of shared technical knowledge and the ability of WHO to provide 
administrative support services, several national delegations strongly resisted this 
because they feared it would give the UN too much control over the fund. 
In interviews conducted for this paper, US government officials and private charitable 
foundations in particular set out a number of criticisms of the UN.5 First, they regarded 
the UN as too bureaucratic and administratively unwieldy to efficiently manage its own 
resources, let alone those of a global financial mechanism. Second, they criticized the 
UN’s corporate governance and political culture as being unsuited to making difficult 
decisions about the allocation of funds. One US government official argued that because 
the UN’s ‘board of directors’ and its ‘clients’ are both drawn from the same group (its 
member states), it is politically obliged to provide a level of financial support to even 
undeserving recipient countries. Moreover, the UN’s lengthy negotiating procedures 
were regarded as an impediment to reaching rapid international agreement on the kinds 
of urgent global problems addressed by MGFs. The organizational design and 
governance arrangements of the GFATM, discussed below, clearly reflect a desire to 
avoid the above pitfalls. Third, the UN and its agencies were seen as more interested in 
‘capturing’ new sources of funding and using them to advance their own institutional 
objectives (or in conducting turf wars among UN agencies) than in being partners in a 
collaborative arrangement such as the GFATM. In contrast to their attitude to the UN, 
the US government and other donor governments were generally more comfortable 
assigning the World Bank significant responsibility in the GFATM, which is reflected 
                                                           
4  The United States and Japan are said to have been the most hostile countries towards the UN at that 
meeting, according to participants interviewed for this study. 
5  These reservations were less likely to be expressed by recipient governments, CSOs and even some 
donor nations such as France. Indeed, in GFATM negotiations, some delegations like the CIS 
countries argued for a greater role for the UN technical agencies in the operation of the fund.  
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in the decision to name the Bank as the fund’s trustee (the Bank also plays a key role in 
the GEF).6 
Despite this deep ambivalence about the UN’s role, UN agencies will nevertheless play 
a major role in the GFATM, providing capacity-building and technical assistance both 
at the country level in the preparation and implementation of project proposals, and 
providing technical and administrative support to the fund’s technical review panel, 
which has the key task of assessing funding proposals and making recommendations to 
the board. Moreover, in part because Secretary-General Kofi Annan was a key instigator 
of the fund, the GFATM remains very closely publicly associated with the UN. 
The paradox of UN involvement in MGFs is that even those who are generally 
suspicious of the UN are forced to acknowledge that, because of their technical and in-
country operational expertise, UN agencies are often essential to the success of this kind 
of enterprise. As a GAVI board member interviewed for this study described it, 
UNICEF and WHO are the most important partners in GAVI because the alliance is 
totally dependent on them for the delivery of core functions. Moreover, as the 
discussion in the rest of this paper makes clear, MGFs must answer the same difficult 
questions about governance, accountability and organizational design that the UN and 
other international organizations faced in their organizational development, and it is not 
necessarily easy to come up with a better answer. 
3  Evaluating the potential of MGFs 
This section considers the claims of MGFs to innovation in four main areas: their 
governance arrangements, the introduction of a system of performance-based funding, 
the notion of multi-stakeholder collaboration and the potential of MGFs to mobilize 
significant additional funds to address global problems. 
3.1  Governance arrangements  
The GFATM was instigated with the often-repeated mantra that it not be ‘another 
bureaucracy’. MGFs have been conceptualized as financial instruments, not 
implementing agencies, so that they themselves do not become large technocratic 
organizations. The governance structure of the GFATM and the other MGFs profiled in 
this study (outlined in Table 1) partially reflect this—they have relatively small 
governing boards based on constituency representation and, at least by the standards of 
most UN agencies, pared-down secretariats consisting of only a small number of 
professional staff.  
The preference for small, constituency-based governing boards is designed to achieve 
ease of decisionmaking while trying to represent as many actors as possible through the 
                                                           
6  In interviews conducted for this study, US government officials and others were more sanguine about 
the Bank’s operational efficiency and decisionmaking processes, but concerns about institutional 
‘capture’ of the fund by the Bank remained an issue. As one US government official put it, ‘the Bank 
has a reputation for taking over everything it touches’. In pre-fund negotiations, some recipient 
governments and CSOs were also worried that the Bank’s fiduciary role would be overly expansive, 
and that the Bank’s standard operating procedures would be imposed on GFATM disbursements.  
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use of a constituency structure. The representational structure of the pared-down MGF 
boards has had mixed success. One potential problem is that board members may be 
either unwilling or unable to act as genuine representatives of their constituency groups. 
For example, Uganda, the East and Southern Africa representative on the GFATM 
board, angered other key states in the region including South Africa, by failing to 
establish adequate consultation processes with them in the first months of the board’s 
operations. Another risk of such structures is that board members will fail to act 
collectively in the interests of the fund rather than for their own groups. Participants in 
the Transitional Working Group (TWG) process through which the GFATM was 
negotiated characterized it as a highly political contest between different national and 
regional constituencies: ‘Not once did I hear someone make an intervention that put 
their own interests aside for those of the fund as a whole’, one TWG member observed 
of the meetings. This seems to have been reflected in the final composition of the fund, 
where key criteria such as which countries are eligible for funding were left extremely 
broad in order to satisfy different national constituencies. 
Moreover, the manner in which MGFs select their board members has raised concerns 
about lack of transparency and, by extension, democratic accountability. Unbound by 
procedural restrictions, the GFATM board was set up in a fairly ad hoc manner. 
According to participants in the selection process, board membership was mainly a 
function of a country’s participation in earlier discussions about the fund, and in the 
case of donor governments, the most powerful states were simply ‘there by rights’. This 
enabled the board to be assembled quickly and with some flexibility, both of which 
were important considering the urgency of the issues the fund was responding to. 
However, such methods are also less transparent and potentially less accountable than 
the formal processes that are used to select the sitting members of key UN committees 
or the governing entities of international agencies, such as elections or formal 
rotations.7  
In creating MGFs, many donors have advocated for small secretariats that are run 
according to modern management principles, in an attempt to avoid the perceived 
inefficiencies and wastefulness of existing international organizations. The lean 
secretariat model is the subject of some scepticism, however. GAVI’s secretariat for 
example, is so small in part because it relies on informally constituted taskforces to do 
much of the critical policy and review work that would otherwise be the responsibility 
of an operational body. These taskforces do not have dedicated human and financial 
resources, and so they rely on ad hoc (and uneven) support from the donor government 
and multilateral agencies that constitute them. As GAVI’s application and 
implementation workload increases, such a small secretariat may be neither realistic nor 
appropriate (Transitional Working Group 2001). The concept of an ultra-lean secretariat 
for the GFATM may also sit uneasily with the substantial responsibilities that have been 
assigned to it, including oversight of monitoring, evaluation and proposal review 
activities and an active role in advocacy and fundraising. It is almost inevitable that over 
time, MGFs will need to develop more formalized rules and procedures relating to many 
aspects of their governance and processes. 
                                                           
7  One way of mitigating the concerns about whether constituency-based structures are sufficiently 
representative or democratic is to build in a paramount plenary body such as the GEF Assembly 
(comprising more than 170 countries) that meets every three years to determine the overall direction 
of the facility, while still leaving most operational decisions to a smaller governing board.  
 
Table 2 
Governance arrangements of the GFATM, Vaccine Fund/GAVI and the GEF compared 
 GFATM GEF  Vaccine  Fund/GAVI 
      
Board and secretariat structure  Paramount structure is 18 member constituency-
based board plus 4 ex-officio members without 
voting rights; 
Secretariat and technical review panels support 
board; 
Partnership Forum advises on fund’s strategic 
direction, conducts advocacy work. 
Assembly consisting of all member states 
meets every 3 years to decide on overall 
direction and mandate of facility; 
32-member constituency-based council is 
key decisionmaking structure; 
Implementing agencies, secretariat, 
country focal points support board 
decisionmaking. 
GAVI: Loosely and informally 
constituency-based board structure, 11 
rotating members and 4 renewable 
members; 
Secretariat, working group and taskforces 
support board decisionmaking; 
Vaccine Fund: 11-member board of 
eminent persons with primary 
responsibility for fundraising and 
advocacy. board considers 
recommendations of GAVI board and 
approves funding disbursements. 
             
NGOs on board  Yes, 2 Southern and 2 Northern  No – GEF is a treaty instrument, and 
board only includes governments 
Yes (GAVI), No (Vaccine Fund) 
             
Private sector on board  Yes, one foundation and one industry  No, see above  Yes (GAVI)  
No (Vaccine Fund) 
             
Research community on board  No  No, see above  Yes (GAVI)  
No (Vaccine Fund) 
             
Multilateral agencies on board  Yes, ex-officio without voting rights  No, see above  Yes (GAVI)  
No (Vaccine Fund) 
             
Decision rules  Consensus; when votes necessary, two-thirds of 
donors and private sector, two-thirds of recipients 
and NGOs required 
Consensus; when votes necessary, 60% 
of donors, 60% of participants required 
GAVI : consensus; simple majority voting 






Early experience suggests that MGFs will face an ongoing tension between the extent to 
which they adopt the principles of private sector management or those of the 
international public sector. During the GFATM negotiations, some stakeholders also 
saw the criteria used to recruit secretariat staff as a means of injecting private sector 
management practices into the fund. For example, the United States pushed 
(unsuccessfully) for a requirement that the successful candidate for Head of Secretariat 
have significant private sector experience. Other constituencies, including some donors 
and many recipient country governments, were more wary of attempts to run the fund 
according to private sector principles and expressed a preference for candidate who was 
more integrated into the international public sector. 
Another aspect of the governance tensions facing MGFs is the extent to which 
inclusiveness and consultation is compromised in favour of being seen as ‘quick to act’ 
in different aspects of fund operations, such as in administrative decisionmaking and the 
disbursement process (in contrast to the way many international organizations are 
perceived). The GFATM was assembled in a matter of months—a remarkably short 
period given the size and scope of the task—because Secretary-General Kofi Annan and 
other key instigators feared a loss of momentum and donor confidence if the fund did 
not come together quickly. This was judged to be more important than a more lengthy 
but inclusive negotiating process of the kind usually located at the United Nations. For 
similar reasons, the GFATM, taking its lead from GAVI’s strategy, moved very quickly, 
once established, to make its first grants. In the GAVI context, the rapid pace of 
applications and tight deadlines this entails has been criticized for preventing nations 
from developing adequate funding applications (Shoof and Phillips 2002). 
3.2 Performance-based  funding 
The introduction of new forms of programme accountability—and specifically the use 
of ‘performance-based funding’—is emerging as a central element of MGFs’ claim to 
innovation. Performance-based funding explicitly links continued funding with 
programme outcomes, as measured by performance in meeting agreed targets. This 
contrasts with more traditional methods of programme accountability employed by 
many bilateral and multilateral financing channels, which tend to focus on the reporting 
of programme inputs rather than on programme outcomes. GAVI, which has pioneered 
this model, uses a system of ‘performance-based shares’, in which US$10 of funding 
per child to strengthen health systems is delivered in advance and an additional US$10 
per child is paid as a retrospective reward for successfully meeting targets for the 
number of children immunized. Rather than imposing detailed guidelines on the use of 
resources, the fund gives governments the freedom to use the funds in whatever way 
leads to the achievement of targets (Brugha and Walt 2001). Funding eventually stops 
altogether if countries fail to meet targets. In response to the perceived success of that 
model the GFATM chose to develop a similar programme accountability regime.  
There are several potential advantages of performance-based funding. First, 
performance-based funding is seen as ‘donor friendly’ by making it easier for donors to 
demonstrate to their constituents that funds are not being wasted and to show tangible 
results from fund activities. Second, aggressively linking funding to performance is said 
to improve programme outcomes. The incentive to misuse funds or spend them on 
overheads, rather than directly on programme recipients, is minimized. Rewarding high-
performing recipients can also draw more attention to the most successful and  
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innovative programme strategies, which should promote a faster convergence towards 
good practice. From the fund’s perspective, restricting funding to reasonably high-
performing recipients may improve the overall outcomes of the fund, even if that 
success is more unevenly distributed across countries or funding recipients. Third, by 
giving recipients the autonomy to use funds as they choose as long as they meet targets, 
performance-based funding should increase country-level ownership of MGF activities. 
Finally, lower transaction costs for recipients may result when the primary obligation of 
funding recipients is to report their performance in meeting targets, and not describe in 
detail how they have managed programme inputs. 
For the reasons set out above, performance-based funding is seen as highly politically 
attractive, especially to donors. However, performance-based funding also carries with 
it several serious potential disadvantages. First, an aggressive focus on meeting 
outcomes-based targets may distort recipient decisionmaking in undesirable ways. In 
order to satisfy donors, governments will have an incentive to manage their funding 
through dedicated vertical structures that speed progress towards meeting specific 
targets, but which might lead to higher transaction costs than if funds were submerged 
into overall health budgets (Brugha and Walt 2001: 154). There is a further risk that 
performance-based funding will tend to direct funds to those projects whose results are 
easily measurable and hence more satisfactory to donors, rather than on projects focused 
on strengthening capacity whose results may be slower to emerge or less visible.8 
Recipients of funding might also be tempted to focus their activities on better-off groups 
where easier gains can be achieved. Second, performance-based funding may simply 
reinforce existing gaps between the capacities of different grant recipients, having the 
circular effect of perpetuating the very factors that made recipients unable to meet their 
targets in the first place. Third, such a system has the potential to penalize excessively 
short-term dips in performance. Finally, the metrics used to assess performance may be 
inappropriate in complex conditions. Performance-based funding regimes may be easier 
to implement in MGFs with a narrowly focused organizational mission such as the 
Vaccine Fund, where immunization coverage rates are a measurable, controllable and 
relevant metric on which to base funding allocations. For funds like GFATM, whose 
mission is more complex and diffuse, it would seem to be harder to link performance to 
a set of targets that recipients can reasonably be expected to control and yet which are 
also focused on the outcomes or results of fund activities (for example, lower disease 
burdens and death rates). It may be necessary for MGFs to address the potential 
problems associated with performance-based funding by implementing remedial and 
support processes with the aim of ensuring that funding recipients are able to receive 
additional tranches of funding even if they experience initial problems in meeting their 
targets. 
                                                           
8  Similar risks arise when donors seek to apply to performance management principles to MGFs 
themselves. In recent years, donors have strongly backed a project led by the GEF Secretariat to 
develop programmatic indicators in order to quantify the results donors can expect for different levels 
of funding within the facility’s four-year financing periods. According to GEF officials interviewed 
for this study, this is having the effect of distorting GEF’s portfolio in favour of projects with 
shorter-time horizons at the expense of long-term, higher payoff strategies (such as the development 
of solar thermal power plants, which are not expected to be profitable for at least ten years).  
9 
3.3 Multi-stakeholder  collaboration 
By giving non-state actors a major role in governance arrangements and in other 
activities, MGFs and other kinds of global policy networks based on similar principles, 
seek to harness the benefits of multi-stakeholder collaboration in ways that could not be 
achieved by simply consulting these groups (Reinicke 1999-2000).9 Partnership with 
the private sector and civil society occurs in a number of ways. First, non-government 
actors may be given a seat alongside governments on the governing boards of MGFs, as 
GAVI and the GFATM have done. This is a contentious issue. According to one view, 
shared governance arrangements are a pre-condition for realizing the benefits of multi-
stakeholder collaboration, because the private sector and civil society can only be 
expected to seriously engage when they are treated as equal partners. Others argue that 
non-government actors cannot be held accountable for the responsible use of funds the 
way (democratically-elected) national governments can. By this logic, only 
governments should have the authority to make the kinds of decisions made by a fund 
like the GFATM, which have the potential for major impact on the lives of many 
people. This tension reflects a much broader debate about the democratic accountability 
of NGOs and their role in global governance. 
Multi-stakeholder collaboration is also built into the structure of MGFs at the country 
level. GFATM and GAVI have established country coordination mechanisms (CCMs) 
that are the interface between the fund and recipient countries. These mechanisms are 
usually led by governments, but include other national stakeholders such as NGOs, the 
private sector and the research community, who jointly prepare consolidated national 
funding proposals and who oversee key aspects of the country’s relationship with the 
MGF. In some cases, the existence of such a mechanism is a condition of a country 
receiving funding. The country coordination model contrasts with the typical structure 
of the donor-recipient relationship in organizations like the World Bank, which is 
focused almost exclusively on national governments and with the model used by the 
GEF, where governments develop and implement proposals in cooperation with 
international organizations, which effectively must approve a project before it is put to 
the GEF’s executive board. 
The major benefits of CCMs are their ability to bring all key national stakeholders 
together. This approach opens channels of communication, allows for coordinated 
action and may foster innovation because of the very different perspectives represented. 
However, while it is tempting to regard this kind of national partnership as 
unambiguously positive, CCMs, like national governments, may come to be controlled 
by small groups who do not consult widely or secure broad domestic support. 
Moreover, while existing national structures may be used or consolidated to serve as 
CCMs, if an entirely new structure needs to be created this could significantly increase 
transaction costs for recipients. The very existence of a fund entails more reporting and 
other administrative requirements for developing countries, which represent an 
opportunity cost in terms of the time invested by senior government officials in 
particular. 
                                                           
9  As defined here, MGFs can be seen as one type of ‘global public policy network’, defined by Reinicke 
(1999-2000), as ‘loose alliances of government agencies, international organizations, corporations and 
elements of civil society, such as nongovernmental organizations, professional associations or 
religious groups that join together to achieve what none could accomplish on its own’,—using 
information sharing, joint action and in this case joint financing to do this.  
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For some, the CCM concept is also an expression of scepticism about the capacities or 
intentions of national governments, and the view that NGOs are often better partners at 
the country  level. During the GFATM negotiations, the US government proposed 
allowing individual NGOs to establish a direct relationship with the fund, so that they 
could make funding applications directly rather than only through the approved CCM. 
As a result, provision now exists for NGOs to apply directly to the fund in certain 
exceptional circumstances, although the decentralized approach has not been adopted 
generally. In doing so, the US seemed to be signalling that at least in some countries, it 
had more faith in NGOs than it did in governments to realize the objectives of the 
GFATM. Interestingly, this position pitted the US against the World Bank who, as 
trustee of the GFATM, strongly opposed dealing directly with NGOs.10 
There are several aspects of multi-stakeholder collaboration that specifically relate to 
the private sector. For example, corporations may act as a supplier of commodities or 
other services to MGFs, such as the bulk procurement of vaccines from the private 
sector that GAVI has undertaken, and that the GFATM is carrying out in order to 
purchase medicines and other products such as bed nets and condoms. MGFs do this 
with the aim of securing much lower prices from companies than would be attainable if 
procurement was decentralized.  
In the GAVI case, early evidence suggests that this strategy has been successful. 
UNICEF has successfully negotiated substantially reduced prices on vaccines from 
GAVI partners. Moreover, as GAVI’s Executive Director Tore Godal puts it, because 
they are being treated as partners and there is ‘real money on the table’, the private 
sector has seriously engaged with the objectives of the alliance and has begun to modify 
its production activities to meet anticipated new demand through the fund. The 
existence of GAVI is also expected to increase incentives for the private sector to 
undertake additional research into new vaccines.  
GAVI’s approach recognizes what one US government official interviewed for this 
study argues is key to the success of public-private partnerships—that involvement in 
these alliances must ultimately be profitable for business. However, as NGO critics, 
among others, have pointed out, the conditions for industry participation can be 
onerous. In the GAVI context, demands by the private sector for a tiered pricing system, 
including safeguards against re-export of products back from developing countries to 
high-priced markets, and a prohibition on compulsory licensing, could outweigh the 
benefits of reduced prices on commodities procurement (Hardon 2001). With the 
enmeshment of the private sector in the governance structures of MGFs, there is a risk 
that policy choices by MGFs will be distorted even when procedures are in place to 
                                                           
10 The Bank, who deals only with governments in its regular funding processes, refused to establish 
independent accountability relationships with individual NGOs and other country-level funding 
recipients during GFATM negotiations. The Bank argued that this would substantially increase its 
transaction costs and those of recipients, many of whom would in any case lack the capacity to 
accurately report to the Bank. Partly to address these concerns, the GFATM has decided to institute a 
system of sub-trustees where a bank or other group at country level provides a bridge between the 
Bank and funding recipients.  
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avoid conflicts of interest between individual partners’ interests and board 
decisionmaking.11 
Another major role for the private sector in MGFs is as providers of specialized 
knowledge or of access to in-country networks. A US government official used the 
example of the way in which Coca Cola, who was a member of the GFATM’s 
Transitional Working Group, could bring its in-country distribution expertise to bear on 
the distribution of bed nets and other commodities for funding recipients. Participants in 
GAVI also spoke positively about the role of the Gates Foundation in encouraging 
innovation and new ideas, and for infusing ‘business thinking’ into its core activities, 
which were once the exclusive domain of national governments and international 
organizations. In those cases where private charitable foundations are the principal 
contributors to MGFs, as is the case with the Gates Foundation and GAVI, these funds 
may increasingly come to resemble, culturally and operationally, the foundations that 
support them. Over time, this might inhibit the ability of MGFs to integrate effectively 
with the international public sector, and especially to conduct the kind of holistic 
policymaking that recognizes the implications of fund activities for other global policies 
and priorities. 
3.4  MGFs as magnets for additional funding 
One of the key expectations underlying the creation of MGFs such as the GFATM is 
that they will be able to mobilize additional resources that could not be raised through 
existing national or international financing channels. When Kofi Annan announced in 
April 2001 that the world needed to raise a further US$7-10bn a year to fight AIDS, TB 
and malaria, the explicit aim was that a global fund would mobilize a substantial portion 
of those extra funds, from both public and private sources. 
There are several reasons why MGFs are seen as magnets for additional funds from 
national governments. First, because they address specific issue areas, the creation of 
MGFS can be used to build momentum and create a sense of urgency around particular 
global problems, increasing their political visibility and importance. Second, they allow 
governments to publicly demonstrate their commitment to addressing a high-profile 
global problem like the AIDS crisis, as the G8 nations did in 2001 when they announced 
their contributions to the GFATM. Third, because they are sold as innovative pilot 
programmes or partnerships, governments find it easier to justify their contribution to 
domestic constituents. Increasing core funding to an international organization (which 
may be discredited domestically) or even increasing bilateral aid tends to be much more 
difficult. Finally, MGFs can argue for additional resources from governments on the 
basis that they are filling a global ‘gap’ (or providing a global public good) that would 
not be provided through their existing bilateral efforts, such as global commodities 
procurement.12 
                                                           
11 GFATM and GAVI have taken such measures. GFATM has elected not to place a pharmaceutical 
company representative on its board, partly out of conflict of interest concerns and in response to the 
opposition of some key nations including France, NGOs and the UN technical agencies. 
12 The UK government, for example, has linked its future support for the GFATM to the fund’s ability to 
fill global gaps in development assistance, such as global commodities procurement, that are not met 
by existing aid initiatives.  
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That said, there are several reasons why claims about the ability of MGFs to attract 
additional public resources may be overstated. First, unlike contributions to 
membership-based international organizations, contributions to MGFs are usually 
voluntary and so governments will only contribute to those funds they find politically 
attractive, which explains the patchy participation by governments in the GFATM and 
GAVI.13 Second, donors tend to be highly conscious of the contributions of other 
industrialized countries. For example, in the most recent GEF replenishment 
negotiations, the United States announced that it would hold constant its contribution to 
the facility in dollar terms. This effectively means that in order for the GEF’s funding to 
grow over the coming four-year period, other countries would have to increase their 
contributions in percentage terms. Japan and France in particular are refusing to do this, 
taking the view that the US is ‘free-riding’. Perhaps most crucially, even if MGFs do 
succeed in attracting significant resources, it does not follow that these resources will 
necessarily be genuinely additional to existing bilateral aid and other donor spending. A 
senior World Bank official interviewed for this study said that he expected that the vast 
majority of funds committed to the GFATM would be substitutive of existing 
spending.14 
Beyond public resources, MGFs aim to become magnets for substantial private sector 
funding. Indeed, some see the private sector and not national governments as the major 
source of contributions for MGFs in the longer term. A US government official 
interviewed for this study argued that if in 5 years, the majority of funds for the 
GFATM are not coming from private sources, the fund will have failed. The long-term 
future of MGFs, according to this view, is philanthropy by wealthy individuals, usually 
acting through private charitable foundations—with 57,000 individuals whose fortunes 
exceed US$30m, they represent a cumulative wealth of US$8.37 trillion. The Gates 
Foundation argues that ‘given financial incentives and technical support’ many of these 
individuals would be willing to commit substantial resources for global purposes 
(Stansfield 2002).  
The emphasis on attracting funds from the private sector has worried some developing 
countries and NGOs, who are concerned that donor governments could use this focus on 
the private sector to distract attention from their core responsibilities (Oxfam 2001). The 
United States already argues that donations from US foundations and corporations 
should effectively be considered part of its national contribution to the GFATM. Indeed, 
foundations themselves sometimes take the philosophical view that certain global 
activities are mainly the responsibility of governments. Strong reservations have been 
also expressed about soliciting corporate donations from industries that may have an 
economic stake in MGF activities through procurement decisions. For this reason, the 
Vaccine Fund does not accept corporate donations from pharmaceutical companies. 
The size of the private sector’s potential contribution to MGFs is in any case difficult to 
gauge. In the funds profiled in this paper, the GFATM has so far failed to attract major 
                                                           
13 Only half of the OECD countries have so far pledged to the GFATM, not including the countries 
represented by the European Commission contribution. To give one example of the unevenness of 
national contributions, while the Netherlands has pledged US$120m to the fund, the highest national 
contribution as a proportion of GDP, Australia—a country with a comparable GDP—has not pledged 
any support to the fund. 
14 The GEF is mainly financed out of existing ODA flows, rather than being additional (see Kaul, Le 
Goulven and Schnupf  2002).  
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private resources, while the GEF has well-developed co-financing arrangements with 
the private sector, rather than direct contributions. GAVI is the exception—the 
US$750m contribution from the Gates Foundation far exceeds any government 
contribution. Several factors seem to affect the willingness of private charitable 
foundations and individual corporations to contribute to MGFs. First, they are more 
likely to make contributions comparable to those of national governments if they are 
given a formal stake in the governance of the fund, as the experience of GAVI in 
particular suggests. Second, they are more likely to support funds that are not perceived 
as government-driven or, as the director of a major a charitable foundation interviewed 
for this study described the GFATM a ‘politicians’ fund’. Third, private sector donors 
want to retain the identity of their contributions. Charitable foundations tend to have 
specific strategic goals and funding priorities that a broad-based fund like GFATM may 
not necessarily be able to accommodate. The implication of this is that in order to secure 
higher levels of private contributions to MGFs, foundations and corporations may need 
to be offered a menu of specific projects with clear and tangible outcomes to fund from 
which to choose, rather than just being solicited to make general contributions. 
However, this kind of earmarking of funds for donor purposes can distort resource 
allocation decisions—in GFATM negotiations, it was generally seen as unacceptable 
(Transitional Work Group). For similar reasons, once one major private contribution has 
been made to an MGF, they may crowd out other private sector interest. The Vaccine 
Fund has found it hard to attract additional private contributions because of the size of 
the Gates Foundation’s contribution as a share of the fund. Some of those interviewed 
for this study argued that the Gates Foundation would have leveraged its contribution to 
raise additional funds more effectively by not putting up such a substantial sum up-
front.15 Finally, the tax and regulatory environment in different national jurisdictions 
can have a significant influence on the level of giving, especially by wealthy 
individuals. Ultimately, if MGFs intend to vigorously pursue private resources, they 
need a comprehensive and professional fundraising strategy (Rivers 2001).16 
In the longer term, one of the greatest challenges for MGFs may be to sustain a 
predictable level of contributions. Because many funds are often created in response to 
perceived global ‘emergencies’, and are sold to donors as exceptional responses to deal 
with exceptional problems, there is a risk that interest fatigue will develop among 
donors over time as other issues begin to take precedence. Donors may be encouraged 
to ‘issue-shop’ between MGFs in response to high-profile emergencies, reducing their 
support to funds that may be dealing with endemic problems (like the spread of 
communicable diseases) and not one-off crises. Because contributions to MGFs are 
voluntary, they are especially prone to free-rider problems over the longer term. MGFs 
are also vulnerable to other factors such as loss of donor confidence because of 
mismanagement of disbursed funds. The consequences of a declining or stagnating 
funding base for MGFs and their beneficiaries are substantial. For example, MGFs may 
fund expensive and capital intensive programmes that cannot then be supported in later 
                                                           
15 Another proposal designed to maintain the identity of individual private sector contributions is to 
allow corporations and foundations who meet certain conditions to ‘brand’ their contributions and 
activities. 
16 Rivers (2001) argues that if the GFATM is to undertake serious fundraising from foundations, 
corporations, wealthy individuals and the general public in particular, it will need either a dedicated 
team within the fund itself or, as the UN Population Fund, UNICEF and GAVI have done, it will have 
to set up a legally independent NGO or network of NGOs to raise funds and represent its interests  
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years if funding shrinks. MGFs often respond to problems with time horizons of ten or 
twenty years with financial resources that are committed for just a few years. Moreover, 
uncertainty about future financial inflows arising from lags between pledging and 
disbursements or insecure future funding commitments can have a disruptive effect on 
the operations of MGFs, although this is clearly a problem that established international 
organizations like the UN also face. 
MGFs can undertake a number of measures to improve the sustainability and 
predictability of their funding bases, including securing multi-year pledges from 
donors,17 withholding certain benefits to nations who do not contribute or are in 
arrears,18 co-financing arrangements with the private sector in order to reduce the 
ongoing financial burden for global funds and to increase the impact of funded 
projects19 and funds matching with organizations such as the World Bank to leverage 
an MGF’s funds in order to secure larger disbursements. 
4 Conclusions 
If the current experiments with multiactor global funds are seen as successful, they can 
be expected to proliferate in other areas, and the creation of global funds with even 
broader mandates is foreseeable. What would a world with many more of such 
instruments look like? One possibility is that will make holistic thinking on longer-time 
horizons more difficult. The stratification of financing into issue-based silos risks 
neglecting the critical synergies between policymaking across issues, leading to more ad 
hoc policymaking and a less coherent response to global problems. Broad-based 
international organizations may ultimately be better positioned to make these 
connections and to make financing decisions accordingly.20  
There is considerable debate about whether broad-based international organizations can 
be held sufficiently democratically accountable through the national governments that 
constitute them.21 However, lines of accountability would seem to be even weaker for 
MGFs. Unlike agencies within the UN system, there is no supervisory body or 
constituency to which MGFs, as corporate entities or the individual actors in them, may 
                                                           
17 Funding commitments to MGFs to date have tended to be relatively informal. The GEF replenishment 
process provides a more structured forum for donors to negotiate funding commitments over four-year 
periods, but as noted above this process can be protracted and political. 
18 An example of this currently being mooted at the GEF is to place restrictions on procurement by the 
facility from non-contributing countries or those in arrears (the Asian Development Bank is 
understood to already have such a policy in place). 
19 The GEF has pursued what a recent performance review calls ‘modest’ attempts at co-financing—for 
example with the IFC or national energy authorities, and is looking to do more, especially with the 
private sector. In the broader sense, the GEF claims that its resources have on average leveraged four 
or five times as much in local investment and other external contributions (World Bank Group 
200: 115). 
20 At a national level, proliferation of issue-based global funds also runs counter to the trend in 
development practice towards integrated country-owned plans such as PRSPs, which are supported by 
non-earmarked funds. This may limit the flexibility and coherence of national policies. 
21 For competing views on whether international organizations can be held democratically accountable, 
and whether this matters, see Dahl (1999) and Keohane (2002).  
15 
be held accountable for fund outcomes or particular decisions. Experience so far 
suggests that the governance arrangements of MGFs can be ad hoc and that national 
participation in them is uneven, making it easier for them to be captured by a few 
powerful states or, as in other forms of international organization, by unelected policy 
specialists and experts.22 Formal inclusion of the private sector and NGOs in 
governance arrangements creates additional challenges in terms of ensuring 
accountability and avoiding potential conflicts of interest. Some thought is now being 
given to ways in which MGFs and similar partnership-based mechanisms might become 
subject to international monitoring and to certain rules designed to make them more 
accountable, but it may be difficult to do this while retaining the spirit of independence 
and experimentalism which is seen as key to their success.23  
There is also a risk that, in spite of their attempts to reduce bureaucracy and 
wastefulness, MGFs will merely duplicate existing governance structures. Issue-based 
funds add to an already crowded landscape of international bodies and financial 
instruments with overlapping organizational missions. MGFs may also increase 
transaction costs at the country  level by creating a new layer of application and 
reporting requirements for these countries. 
For all of these potential problems, however, the future of MGFs is at least as much 
about politics as it is about their underlying merits. MGFs like the GFATM currently 
have political momentum, the interest of some powerful states and, partly as a result, an 
ability to generate focus on important global issues that international organizations are 
struggling to achieve. If governments and the private sector invest their energies and 
resources into these instruments because they perceive them as delivering results, MGFs 
may indeed be able to mobilize genuinely additional funds for global priorities, which 
would help in meeting globally agreed objectives like the Millennium Development 
Goals. Moreover, MGFs may prove to be a politically viable way to advance the global 
public goods agenda because they can be sold as dedicated financial mechanisms to fill 
specific global gaps. 
While this report has sought to put the aspirations of MGFs into perspective, these 
instruments, like other forms of networked governance, also promise a great deal. 
Certain kinds of multi-stakeholder collaboration, or carefully implemented 
performance-based funding systems, for example, may indeed produce success stories 
that can then be replicated elsewhere in the international system. Multiactor global 
funds are at least somewhat less encumbered by the rigidities of more established 
entities, and so they offer an arena for experimentation and innovation in global 
governance.  
                                                           
22 As Ngaire Woods argues the deeper question, and the one in need of more detailed study, is that of 
whose interests these new forms of global governance are furthering (Wood 2002). 
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